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Abstract— Anonymous online business environments have a 
social dilemma situation in it. A dilemma on whether to 
cooperate or Defect. Defection by a buyer to seller and/or seller 
to buyer might give each a better profit at the cost of the loss of 
other. However, if these parties were to interact in future too, a 
bad past reference might prevent cooperative actions, thus 
depriving each other from a better gain. The anonymity of the 
players and an absence of central governing body still make this 
environment tempting for the defectors. What might be the 
evolutionary behavior of defectors in such environment? How 
could their increasing population be controlled? It is these two 
questions basically that we attempt to address in this research 
work. A genetic algorithm based spatial iterated prisoner’s 
dilemma (SIPD) environment has been used to simulate the 
experiments. A case where compensation for the looser is 
provided by the system is modeled and analyzed through 
experiments. Our results show that compensation can be useful 
in decreasing defective population in the society, however, this 
might not be enough for the evolution of a cooperative and 
reliable society of trustworthy players. 
 
Index Terms—Genetic Algorithm, Evolution of Cooperation, 
Online Business, Prisoner’s Dilemma  
I. INTRODUCTION 
usinesses are typically characterized by a motive to 
maximize profit. To a seller, maximization of profit 
allows greater benefit and also serves its sustainable 
growth in a competitive market environment. Similarly, a 
buyer would also look for a suitable bargain in the cost price 
to maximize its gain. When a cooperative seller interacts with 
a cooperative buyer, both of the players (we would use this 
term player to denote a buyer or seller in general) would end 
up in a happy transaction. 
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The seller makes its profit while the buyer gets the goods in a 
better price, thus making the transaction beneficial to both of 
them. In a setting where they are dealing in a credit 
transaction, if one of them turns out to be selfish, the 
cooperator is badly defected, while the selfish one benefits the 
most.  In such an environment, any rational player finds 
incentives for its selfishness and also enjoys a lesser risk over 
cooperation which might lead to its defeat in case the other 
player defects. Thankfully, in the real world, this situation is 
eased by the presence of governing bodies and the possibility 
of physical identification of players.  Further, selfish behavior 
of a player can be at the cost of its credibility which is an 
important thing for a player to maintain in order to ensure a 
renewed interest of the other party in future transactions. 
Cooperation however might not be an easy thing to achieve in 
an online business environment (generalized term for 
electronic markets) where anonymity of a player might aid in 
making the situation manipulable by the strategic ones. The 
types of environments that we consider here are typically 
characterized by the lack of a central governing body which 
would verify the identity of the players and maintain ‘a law 
and order situation’ in it. Today’s popular e-Business sites like 
eBay and the Peer to Peer networks in their extreme form can 
be an example of this type of environment. EBay maintains 
centrally the data of its members and lists their credibility by 
providing publicly their reputation information [1]. These 
information to certain extent, help the player in perceiving 
security in transaction, but still in absence of a physical 
security, strategic players can earn higher payoff for their 
selfish and deceptive act. How then would cooperation evolve 
in online business scenario? It is this interesting aspect of 
cooperation evolution that we are investigating through our 
experiments.  In this paper, we report the outcomes of our 
investigation into how and under what conditions cooperation 
might evolve in an online business environment which lacks a 
central governing body. 
 
The remaining part of this paper is structured as follows: 
Section II gives background information to IPD and On-line 
business game and also reviews some of the related works in 
this area. The details of the system are presented in Section 
III. Section IV lists some experimental results and analysis. 
Conclusion and future works in this area is highlighted in 
Section V. 
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II. IPD AND ON-LINE BUSINESS GAMES 
We relate the situation in our online business environment to 
that in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. Prisoner’s dilemma like 
puzzle structures were first devised by Merrill Flood and 
Melvin Dresher in 1950, while the term “Prisoner’s Dilemma” 
and the version with prison sentences as payoffs is credited to 
Albert Tucker [2]. Further description with interesting cases 
from society was given by Axelrod in [3] and the evolution of 
strategies in an Iterated Prisoners Dilemma (IPD) environment 
described by the same author in [4]. In a prisoner’s dilemma 
game setting, there are two prisoners held for some crime and 
being interrogated separately. They share a dilemma as they 
don’t get to see each other and one does not know what the 
other is going to say about the crime. Each prisoner has an 
option to give evidence against its partner by defecting him, or 
to cooperate by holding the evidence.  Three particular 
situations can arise in this case: 
i. Both of them can cooperate by holding evidence, thus the 
judge can have a less doubt over their guilt and decide for a 
relatively shorter imprisonment (Say 1 year) 
ii. Both of them can defect by providing evidence against each 
other, thus making it easy to reveal their involvement. In this 
case the judge might decide for a longer imprisonment for 
both of them (say 3 years).  
iii. One of them can defect while the other cooperates. In 
this case the defector might be set free while the cooperator 
being proven guilty could be given an even longer sentence 
(say 5 years) 
This situation can also be expressed in a pay off matrix as in 
Table I below: 
TABLE I  
PAYOFF MATRIX FOR A TYPICAL PD GAME 
Prisoner B 
   Cooperate (C) Defect (D) 
C Punish A=1 yr 
 
Punish B=1 yr 
Punish A=5 yrs 
 
Punish B=0 yrs 
D Punish A=0 yrs 
 
Punish B=5 yrs 
Punish A= 3yrs 
 
Punish B=3 yrs 
 
The values for the pay off are typically called Reward for 
cooperation (R), Temptation to defect (T), Sucker’s Payoff (S) 
for cooperating a defective player, and Punishment for mutual 
defection (P). For the dilemma to hold, the following 
condition must hold true [3]: 
SPRT >>>                                 (1) 
In the prisoner’s example above these values correspond to 
the benefit that each would derive from the respective actions. 
There is further an interesting consequence if the game is 
being played for more than one round. Typically known as 
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD), in such game the pay-off 
for two times reward is higher than the summed payoff for 
Temptation and sucker payoff. Thus an additional condition 
given below must also hold true in this case [3] [2]. 
STR +>2                                       (2) 
The situation in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma is also a 
representative to online business environment[5] [6]. If we 
consider an online trading environment where two completely 
anonymous buyer and seller are interacting, they share a 
dilemma on whether or not the other party would reciprocate 
its cooperation. If the seller sends the good and the buyer 
sends money worth the goods, both of them are rewarded and 
the transaction meets a happy ending. If either of them defects 
while the other cooperates, then the cooperator is badly hurt in 
the transaction and the defector scores highest. If both defect 
each other then each scores a payoff better than sucker’s score 
(and interestingly equal to reward in value as both posses the 
money and goods with them), but is nevertheless going to be a 
bad reference for future transaction. Further, a payoff for a 
both defect scenario cannot be considered equal to Reward, as 
there has been no transaction at all. A zero return for no 
transaction is what the payoff in this case would be.   
A major difference this situation has with the traditional 
IPD tournaments is that, here it is not necessary for each 
player to play with every player in the society. A variation of 
IPD called Spatial IPD represents this scenario better. In 
spatial IPD the players are arranged in some “geographical” 
positions and most of the interactions take place between the 
neighboring players[2]. Such arrangements exhibit games in 
clusters thus providing natural representation of our problem 
[7]. As an example, in eBay like setting, sales items are put 
under several categories and each category has some defined 
sets of sellers who interact with buyers sharing similar 
interest. If we were to measure an overall evolution of 
cooperation, these individual categories of players are the 
source for it.   It is in this environment that our research 
focuses on investigating the evolution of cooperation. The 
detail of the model is described in Section III. 
In one of the most remarkable works on the evolution of 
cooperation Axelrod in [3]  presents an optimism to 
cooperation by addressing fundamental realities of human 
nature. Starting from basic questions like when should a 
person be cooperative, and when selfish, his work tries to 
demystify the complexity of cooperation in humans by 
relating it to a Prisoner’s dilemma situation. Based on 
Prisoner’s dilemma again, Axelrod in [4] conducted a 
tournament of strategies in which he used Genetic Algorithms 
to identify a fittest and an evolutionarily stable strategy. Issues 
relating to the evolution of cooperation, Trust and Reputation 
have been addressed by various authors in [5], [6] [8], [9]. 
Aberer in [5] outlines the complexity of Trust and 
Reputation and discusses different approaches to computing 
trust and reputation. The authors have considered evolutionary 
approach as one of the many popular approaches that game 
theorists have been using.  In [6] the authors have presented a 
social mechanism of reputation management in electronic 
communities. In their discussion around electronic 
communities, the authors have described the Prisoner’s 
dilemma situation in it. In a related work Janssen in [8] has  
studied the role of reputation scores in the evolution of 
cooperation in online e-commerce sites. The author discusses 
whether or not reputation alone can be meaningful in evolving 
a cooperative society. The paper concludes that high level 
cooperation is not only possible with reputation scores. The 
author investigates the work in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma 
like environment. In [9], the author has studied the impact of 
providing incentive to cooperation as a side payment scheme 
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to make it rational for the agents to be cooperative. The 
proposed model is described using an Iterated Prisoners’ 
Dilemma scenario.  
III. THE SYSTEM 
A. Business Game Models 
The anonymous business game between two players, a buyer 
and a seller described in the introduction section can also be 
expressed in terms of a payoff matrix as in Table I. Let γ be 
the price of goods that is being purchased by a buyer from 
some seller. The amount of money the buyer has to pay the 
seller is the price of the goods, thus in this case this also 
equals γ in value. The gains of these two players in four 
different possible action sequences are summarized by the 
matrix in Table II below: 
TABLE II  
PAYOFF MATRIX FOR A TYPICAL BUSINESS GAME 
Buyer 
   Cooperate (C) Defect (D) 
C Rseller= γ 
Rbuyer= γ 
Sseller =  - γ   
Tbuyer = 2 γ 
D Tseller = 2 γ 
Sbuyer = - γ 
Pseller = 0  
Pbuyer = 0  
 
     The notations T, R, P and S have the same meaning as in 
(1). The relationships between the values here are still 
conformant to the inequalities in (1) and (2). Thus this 
situation imposes a Strong Dilemma in the players.   
 
Another typical business game is an eBay like scenario. We 
take eBay as a representative of online auction environments 
and there might be others in its class offering similar services.  
This setting is different from the one described in Table I,  in a 
way that eBay has buyer and seller protection programs 
which compensates to some extent the loss incurred, if any 
[10]. Let δ be the factor with which losses are compensated. 
Including this compensation scheme the new payoffs for the 
game are given in Table III below: 
TABLE III  
PAYOFF MATRIX FOR A COMPENSATED BUSINESS GAME 
Buyer 
   Cooperate (C) Defect (D) 
C Rseller= γ 
Rbuyer= γ 
Sseller =  - γ + δ 
Tbuyer = 2 γ 
D Tseller = 2 γ 
Sbuyer = - γ+ δ 
Pseller = 0 
Pbuyer = 0  
The compensation factor introduces a new relationship in the 
payoff inequalities described in (1) and (2) above. While the 
exact new condition is a factor of δ in reality, this addition of 
δ nevertheless changes the Strong Dilemma into a Weak 
Dilemma situation. The particular change is given in the 
equation below: 
      SP ≥                                                                       (3) 
This small change introduces interesting consequence, as it 
increase the confidence of the player in acting cooperatively. 
In a real world scenario, if there is a third party protection for 
a transaction, the confidence of a buyer or seller increases, and 
this increase is proportional to the fraction of compensation 
provided.  
We simulate the evolution of cooperation in each of the Cases 
(Strong Dilemma, and weak dilemma) described above and 
present the results in next section.  
B.  Simulation Model 
At the highest level of abstraction, our simulation model 
consists of a two dimensional spatial grid of players on a 
square surface with overlapping edges. Each player has eight 
neighbors with whom it plays the cooperation defection game. 
Players are characterized by strategies for a 3-memory game. 
This means that each player while interacting with its 
neighbor will keep track of past three games. An action on 
what to do next will be guided by the particular strategy that 
matches the past three histories of interactions that each player 
maintains. Corresponding moves for initial interactions until 
the three games are played are also encoded in player 
strategies. Figure 1 below shows a sample 5x5 square grid 
with 25 players in it. The highlighted player P7 plays games 
for a specified number of times with its eight neighbors who 
are P1, P2, P3, P8, P6, P13, P12, and P11. The games 
mentioned here represent the business interactions described 
in the Introduction section and section III A above.  
 
P0 P1 P2 P3 P4 
P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 
P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 
P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 
P20 P21 P22 P23 P24 
 
Fig. 1. A 5X5 spatial grid with a player P7 highlighting its 8 neighbors 
 
The actual evolution in the game is based on Genetic 
Algorithm. Genetic Algorithm (GA) as an intelligent search 
technique was introduced by computer scientist John Holland 
[11] [12] [4]. Our use of GA based evolution is based on, and 
inspired by, the original work of Axelrod in [4]. In the GA 
environment, a player strategy is represented by a 
chromosome as a fixed length representation of the possible 
actions for a three memory game. With two possible actions 
(Cooperate or Defect) that can be played by each of the two 
interacting players, the all possible moves are CC, CD, DC, 
and DD. A three memory strategy for these four possible 
moves needed 4x4x4=64 bit chromosome length. Axelrod in 
[4] used additional 6 bits to determine the first three moves. A 
variation of this was used by Errity in [13] and we are 
following the same scheme of additional bit encoding, in 
which 7 extra bits are used for encoding actions for the first 
three relative moves (relative to opponent moves). In this 
approach it is not required to encode an assumption of the pre-
game history [13]. This makes the total chromosome length to 
be 71 bits with each locus outlining an action C or D to 
perform. The model when initialized consists of a specified 
number of players with random strategies. In each generation 
of evolution a pre-specified number of games are played 
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between two players, at the end of which, the fitness of the 
chromosome of each player is evaluated by referring to the 
payoff values for the game. From player A’s perspective, a 
CC action represents Reward Payoff, CD a Sucker’s Payoff, 
DC a Temptation Payoff and DD a Punishment Payoff. Fittest 
strategies are selected for reproduction through crossover and 
mutation. During crossover, both the parent chromosomes are 
broken in at the same random point. Linear scaling as 
described in [12] of the fitness has been used to prevent 
premature convergence of the evolution.  The results obtained 
for the cases in section III A by using this model is explained 
in the next section.       
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. The Setup 
The experiments were carried out for three different cases. In 
the first case (CASE I), the strong dilemma situation outlined 
in Table II was considered and next we focused on the weak 
dilemma situation outlined in Table III. In the later case we 
performed the experiments for two sub cases. The first (CASE 
IIA) being a situation were the loss compensation percentage 
was 50, and in the second (CASE IIB) this percentage was set 
to 100. Thus, for the first case  2/R=δ  and in second case 
R=δ . The following parameters in table IV were used for 
all three experiments:    
TABLE IV 
SIMULATION PARAMETER 
Parameter Value 
Total number of Players 2500 
Generations of Evolution 1000 
Transactions per Generation 200 
Crossover Probability 0.98 
Mutation Probability 0.01 
The player population of 2500 was chosen to represent a good 
size of strategies. Simulations were limited to 1000 
generations as at this point, the evolution was relatively stable. 
We had to be careful with the number of transactions as this 
number was proportional to the time taken by the simulation. 
However, a small value for transaction frequency might 
prevent the players from exploiting most of their memory 
three strategies. Axelrod in [4] had used an average run length 
of 151 for his strategy tournament.  We took an intuitive value 
of 200 as a tradeoff between performance and fitness.  The 
probabilities for crossover and mutation were kept fixed for 
all the transaction. Though a variance in these values might 
give different patterns of evolution, this analysis is currently is 
not included in our experiments. 
  
  Next set of parameters of the experiments were related to 
the payoff values which would be different for each of the 
cases outlined above. For this experiment we have assumed 
that all the goods being sold or purchased has the same value 
of £ 10, thus making reward for cooperation R=10. Based on 
this assumption, the other payoff values used for the three 
different cases are listed in the table V. 
 
 
TABLE V 
PAYOFF VALUES 
Payoff Category CASE I CASE IIA CASE IIB 
Reward (R) 10 10 10 
Temptation (T) 2R 2R 2R
Sucker’s (S) -R -R+ δ  -R+ δ 
Punishment (P) 0 0 0 
Compensation (δ) N/A R/2 R 
 
The initial population roughly consisted of around 80% of 
cooperative players and 20% of deceptive ones. As we have 
been trying to observe the trend of the evolution of defectors, 
their size was intentionally kept small initially so that a full 
span of their evolution could be visible in the results. In the 
definition, we consider a player to be cooperative, if more 
than 60% of its strategy guides cooperation to its action. Thus 
a defector has essentially less than 40% of cooperative actions 
in its strategy. We also consider in our experiments, a 
particular species of defector called Top Defector. This player 
has the most vindictive nature with more than 75% of its 
strategy guiding defective action to its opponent.  
B. Results and Analysis 
From the cooperative evolution point of view, all the 
experiments gave depressive results. This can be easily 
derived from the graphs in Figure 2, as a graph for 
cooperative evolution would be complementary to these. To 
reach these results, the simulations for each of the cases listed 
in Table V were carried out for five times and an average 
taken to minimize the noise in evolution statistics. Fig 2a. 
Shows the evolution of defectors in a strong dilemma 
situation. This situation, as described earlier, is a 
representative of an anonymous online business environment. 
In a condition where there is no mechanism which can enforce 
cooperation, it is natural that defection prevails, as this would 
give success to the player. The population of defectors which 
started from a mere 17% sharply increased until it reached a 
maximum of 74% in the 724th generation, after which it 
maintained a population in between 60-70%. This trend 
reflects the high insecurity in transactions in these settings.   
  What might be the result if the ones who lost in transaction 
were compensated? Would it contribute in reducing the 
defectors in the society? The two graphs in Fig 2a and 2b have 
an answer to these questions. The results show that 
compensation certainly has negative impact on the growth of 
defectors and this impact is in some value proportional to the 
fraction of compensation.  Fig 2b is a 50% compensation case.  
The result shows that the population of defectors in this 
setting has decreased as compared to the previous case, with a 
maximum population of only 55.16% in 275th generation. In 
case where a defected cooperator is returned full of the 
amount of goods or money, the cooperation evolution scenario 
was even better, with a record of only 45.70% of highest 
defectors in 233rd generation.  
 
The three figures discussed above represented the overall 
population of defectors. The impact of compensation was 
sharply visible in a particular species of defector which we 
call here Top Defector. This species has a strategy which 
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allows it to cooperate only 25% of time. The evolution of this 
species is considered by the graph in Fig 3. The population of 
this species was highest in the strong dilemma case and a 
lower and yet lower portion was seen in the other two cases.  
This suggests that the compensation scheme was successful in 
bringing down the population of this category of players. 
However, defective players are still prevalent in any of the 
cases examined above.  The outcome of these experiments 
suggests that an even stronger model to weaken the dilemma 
is required in order to promote cooperative evolution in online 
business settings. Investigation of such techniques which can 
curb the defector population while increasing the size of 
cooperators is the future work of our research.    
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Defector Evoution in Weak Dilemma With 50% Loss Coverage
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Defector Evoution in Weak Dilemma With 100% Loss Coverage
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Fig 2. Evolution of Defective Players in (a) Strong Dilemma 
Conditions as in equation (1) and (2), (b) Weak Dilemma 
Condition with 50% Loss coverage, (c) Weak Dilemma Condition 
with 100% loss coverage 
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Fig 3. Evolution of Top Defectors in various conditions 
 
V. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION  
It was not originally our intention to cast the “villains” 
(defectors) in our work. We initially started with the trend in 
evolution of cooperators. Ironically, the model that we were 
using in our experiments (which in some way resembles the 
real world) gave depressive results for the evolution of 
cooperators. Insignificant impact of the model was seen in the 
evolution of cooperative players. This gave us a better insight 
into how fragile the situation was. We then turned our idea the 
other way round to see if these models had any impact on the 
defectors at all. The results showed that the models certainly 
had an impact on defectors and severely on the most selfish 
species which we named as Top Defectors. This is however 
not sufficiently reliable for online transactions; a conclusion 
that we have drawn from our experiments.  
 
For the evolution of safer societies for transaction, we might 
need more powerful models which could attack on the 
dilemma conditions and make it rational for the players to 
cooperate. Compensation to the looser is one approach. An 
approach that could complement the need here might be to 
provide incentives to the cooperators. In real world online 
business scenarios however, it might not be rational to directly 
give a benefit to someone just because they acted nicely. 
Indirect reflection of incentives on their reputation might be a 
promising idea of rewarding that could lead to cooperative 
evolution. Our future work in this regard would be in 
identifying to what extent can reputation systems in real world 
contribute in the evolution of cooperation in society.  We 
expect these results combined with the loss compensation 
scheme to give insightful feedback on the trustworthiness of 
players in online business environments.              
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